Introduction {#Sec1}
============

With the expected advent of quantum computers, current public key cryptography algorithms based on discrete logarithm and factorization problems will have to be replaced by stronger, so-called post-quantum cryptography algorithms. Isogeny-based cryptography is among the leading approaches currently considered for post-quantum cryptography. A major protocol in isogeny-based cryptography is the SIDH key exchange protocol \[[@CR7]\], whose principles underlie the SIKE algorithm recently submitted to the NIST post-quantum standardization process \[[@CR6], [@CR8]\].

In internet communication contexts, key exchange protocols are often used in a semi-static mode, where the server uses the same *static* secret key to establish any new session key with a client. Galbraith et al. have shown that the basic SIDH protocol is vulnerable to adaptive attacks in these contexts \[[@CR4]\]. In SIKE the attacks are defeated by using a variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform.

The *k*-SIDH protocol is an alternative countermeasure to Galbraith et al.'s attack suggested by Azarderakhsh et al. \[[@CR2]\]. The protocol has the additional advantage to allow for static-static key exchange (where both parties use static keys), but it comes at the cost of a significant efficiency loss as it essentially involves running $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$k=92$$\end{document}$ suggested by the authors. Very recently, Dobson et al. described an adaptive attack against the 2-SIDH protocol \[[@CR3]\]. Their attack also generalizes to the *k*-SIDH protocol with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$k>2$$\end{document}$, though the required number of instances of the protocol with the server is exponential in *k*.

*Our Contributions.* In this paper, we provide a new adaptive attack on a variant of the *k*-SIDH protocol suggested by Jao and Urbanik \[[@CR10]\]. The Jao-Urbanik protocol introduces some redundancy in *k*-SIDH's secret keys using the non-trivial automorphisms of curves with *j*-invariants 0 or 1728 to increase efficiency. While the authors of the protocol conjectured that the inherent structure could be exploited in attacks and chose larger security parameters to account for this, we provide a concrete attack.

Our attack borrows from Galbraith et al. and Dobson et al.'s attacks, but it crucially differs from them in the following ways:We use the underlying relationship between the kernel generators of corresponding curves to match up triples of candidate curves instead of exhaustively searching over all possibilities when querying for the first key bits.Instead of separately computing the key bits and pullbacks at any step of the attack, we combine these stages by guessing the key bits and computing candidate pullbacks first to then validate any possible combination using the oracle.Contrasting to the attack in \[[@CR3]\], we manage to compute precise pullbacks at each step instead of having to keep track of multiple candidates which are indistinguishable to the attacker.Overall, we significantly reduce the number of oracle queries by exploiting the structure underlying the Jao-Urbanik protocol.

We show that our attack requires to run $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathcal {O}(32^{k/3})$$\end{document}$ instances of the protocol with the server, if the Jao-Urbanik protocol is instantiated with secret isogenies of degree a power of two. This is almost a cube root speedup compared to Dobson et al.'s attack on the same instantiation.

While our attack does not break the security level for the parameter sets recommended by Jao and Urbanik, we give estimated attack costs for their parameters. Under consideration of currently known attacks against k-SIDH and Jao-Urbanik's protocol, we conclude that the former provides a better efficiency-security trade-off.

*Outline.* The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. To begin with, we give some background on isogenies and supersingular isogeny protocols in Sect. [2](#Sec2){ref-type="sec"}. We then recall the Dobson et al. attack on *k*-SIDH in Sect. [3](#Sec7){ref-type="sec"} and the Jao-Urbanik protocol in Sect. [4](#Sec8){ref-type="sec"}. We continue by describing our attack on Jao-Urbanik's scheme in Sect. [5](#Sec11){ref-type="sec"}, and conclude the paper in Sect. [6](#Sec17){ref-type="sec"}. The Appendix includes an extension of our attack.

Preliminaries {#Sec2}
=============

For a full treatment of background information on elliptic curves we refer to Silverman \[[@CR9]\].

Isogenies {#Sec3}
---------
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                \begin{document}$$\mathbb {F}_q$$\end{document}$ be a finite field of characteristic *p*. In the following we assume $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\mathcal {O}_E$$\end{document}$ being the identity element. The *j-invariant* of an elliptic curve is$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\phi (\mathcal {O}_{E_1})=\mathcal {O}_{E_2}$$\end{document}$. The condition implies that isogenies are also group homomorphisms. If there exists an isogeny $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\phi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$$\end{document}$, then there exists a unique isogeny $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\hat{\phi }: E_2 \rightarrow E_1$$\end{document}$, called the *dual* isogeny, such that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$E_2$$\end{document}$). If there exists a non-constant isogeny between two curves, then they are called *isogenous*. The *degree* of an isogeny $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\phi $$\end{document}$ is its degree when treated as an algebraic map. If the isogeny is separable (which is always the case in this work), the degree is equal to the size of the kernel of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\phi $$\end{document}$. An isogeny from *E* to itself is called an endomorphism. Endomorphisms of an elliptic curve form a ring under addition and composition. If *E* is defined over a finite field then the endomorphism ring is either an order in an imaginary quadratic number field (such curves are called *ordinary*) or an order in the quaternion algebra ramified at *p* (the characteristic of the finite field) and at infinity. The latter curves are called *supersingular*. In this paper we will only consider supersingular elliptic curves.

Since an isogeny defines a group homomorphism $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$E_2 = E_1/S$$\end{document}$. Furthermore, if the degree of the isogeny is smooth, Vélu's formulae \[[@CR11]\] provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing the isogeny (as a rational map) from its kernel.

The following lemma \[[@CR9], Chapter III, Corollary 4.11\] describes how the isogenies corresponding to two subgroups can be related if one subgroup contains the other:

### Lemma 1 {#FPar1}
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SIDH {#Sec4}
----

In this subsection, we recall Jao and De Feo's original scheme \[[@CR7]\].

Let *E* be a supersingular elliptic curve. In the setup, one chooses two small primes $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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In \[[@CR4]\] Galbraith et al. propose an adaptive attack against SIDH, showing that SIDH is not suitable for static-static key exchange; see Sect. [2.4](#Sec6){ref-type="sec"} for a description of the GPST attack.

*k*-SIDH {#Sec5}
--------
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The GPST Attack on Static SIDH {#Sec6}
------------------------------

The adaptive GPST attack actively recovers the static SIDH key $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Definition 1 {#FPar2}
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### Lemma 2 {#FPar3}
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Afterwards, the attacker can proceed iteratively for all but the last two bits. Assume the attacker has recovered the *i* least significant bits of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Lemma 3 {#FPar4}
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### Proof {#FPar5}
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The DGLTZ Attack {#Sec7}
================

The DGLTZ attack \[[@CR3]\] follows roughly the same methodology as the GPST one.
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Definition 2 {#FPar6}
------------

**(Oracle in** *k***-SIDH).** Let *H* be some public hash function. Upon receipt of an elliptic curve *E*, two points *R*, *S* spanning $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Note that this oracle provides information related to the *k*-tuple of static secret keys $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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To compensate for this limited information, multiple oracle queries will be made using the same malicious points but different hash values. After obtaining the curves $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Lemma 4 {#FPar7}
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Lemma 5 {#FPar8}
-------
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The Jao-Urbanik Protocol {#Sec8}
========================

In this section, we present the Jao-Urbanik protocol \[[@CR10]\], the main target of our attack.

To reduce the cost associated to *k*-SIDH \[[@CR2]\], Jao and Urbanik propose to exploit the existence of non-trivial automorphisms on certain elliptic curves for a non-interactive key exchange by using distinct isogenies between isomorphic curves. As in the original SIDH proposal \[[@CR7]\], the authors suggest choosing parameters as follows: Let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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The only elliptic curves with non-trivial automorphisms are curves with *j*-invariants $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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The existence of these automorphisms can be exploited in the following way. If $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$G\subseteq E$$\end{document}$ is a subgroup, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\eta _6(G)$$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\eta _6^2(G)$$\end{document}$ are also subgroups of *E* and we may assume that all three are distinct[2](#Fn2){ref-type="fn"}. Hence, the isogenies from *E* associated to the kernels $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$G, \eta _6(G)$$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\eta _6^2(G)$$\end{document}$, respectively, are all distinct while the corresponding quotients are isomorphic. For example, consider $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\phi :E\rightarrow E/G$$\end{document}$; the map $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\phi \circ \eta _6^{-1}:E\rightarrow E/G$$\end{document}$ has kernel $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\eta _6(G)$$\end{document}$ and hence we have $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$E/G \cong E/\eta _6(G)$$\end{document}$. In an SIDH-setting when Alice sends a public key $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$(E_A, \phi _A(P_B), \phi _A(Q_B))$$\end{document}$, we can thus view this as Alice actually having sent three distinct but related public keys. These keys all have isomorphic target curves $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$E/ \langle A\rangle \cong E/\langle \eta _6(A)\rangle \cong E/\langle \eta _6^2(A)\rangle $$\end{document}$, and hence share the same *j*-invariant, but the corresponding isogenies are not isomorphic. The same applies to any of Bob's public keys.

Lemma 6 {#FPar9}
-------
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Parameter Selection {#Sec9}
-------------------
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In their discussion, the authors do not disclose a precise attack model and consider an oracle which receives a list of curves and returns true if all of them are on the secret isogeny path $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Current Impact of DGLTZ on Jao-Urbanik Protocol {#Sec10}
-----------------------------------------------
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Our aim is that instead of treating the three curves independently we use that the three kernels are related and propose an attack in the next section which uses $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\mathcal {O}(32^{\frac{k}{3}})$$\end{document}$ queries, thus providing a nearly cube root speedup.

Adaptive Attack Against the Jao-Urbanik Scheme {#Sec11}
==============================================

In this section, we describe our adaptive attack on the $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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This is not dissimilar to what is done in the DGLTZ attack, but our attack exploits the additional structure between the shared secrets in the Jao-Urbanik protocol to recover the exact pullbacks at each step (instead of keeping two candidates) and reduce the number of queries needed for bit recovery. We thus show that the security of the Jao-Urbanik protocol with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We present our attack only by querying with points on the starting curve *E*, as in the DGLTZ attack. Appendix [A](#Sec18){ref-type="sec"} presents a method to extend our attack to an arbitrary curve, which can also be applied to the DGLTZ attack.
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Lemma 7 {#FPar10}
-------

For simplicity, denote subscripts of the form *A*, *i* by *i*. Then,

Lemma 8 {#FPar11}
-------
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Proof {#FPar12}
-----
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Attack Model: A New Oracle {#Sec12}
--------------------------

In this section, we describe our assumptions and our attack model.
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Exploiting the Additional Structure: First Step {#Sec13}
-----------------------------------------------
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Intermediate Bit and Pullback Computation {#Sec14}
-----------------------------------------
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### Proof {#FPar14}

The first claim is trivial. For the second claim, observe that the sum of these quantities is even, thus it is not possible that all three of them are odd. If $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Now, we prove our main lemma.

### Lemma 10 {#FPar15}

If the oracle query returns *true*, then we have found $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Proof {#FPar16}
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### Theorem 1 {#FPar17}
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### Theorem 2 {#FPar18}
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Theorem [2](#FPar18){ref-type="sec"} does not break the security parameters suggested by Jao and Urbanik. However, in order to assess the security gain of Jao-Urbanik's protocol, we compare it with the security of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Conclusion {#Sec17}
==========

We have introduced an adaptive attack against Jao-Urbanik's protocol with parameter $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\ell = 13$$\end{document}$, our attack can be extended to that case as briefly described in the previous section. The complexity of such an attack increases significantly, possibly reaching levels where the protocol is secure for the specified parameter sets. However, even in that case, our attack provides a nearly cubic speedup compared to a generic application of Dobson et al.'s attack against the Jao-Urbanik scheme. Assessing security of *k*-SIDH and Jao-Urbanik's variant of it with respect to currently known attacks, we conclude that Jao-Urbanik's protocol does not seem to offer a sufficient security improvement over *k*-SIDH with the same number of secret keys to justify the roughly two times more computations needed.

We leave a more thorough examination of whether a combination of stages in an attack on *k*-SIDH can evoke further optimizations to future work. Any potential improvements in the attack cost would then make it necessary to reevaluate the efficiency-security trade-off when comparing *k*-SIDH and the Jao-Urbanik protocol.
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Lemma 11 {#FPar19}
--------
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Note that this estimation is not given in \[[@CR3]\].
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Note that the GPST attack \[[@CR4]\] shows how to implement a similar oracle for SIDH.
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